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Criminal Law and Procedure 
by Rex A. Collings, Jr. * 
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every 
advantage. Our dangers do not lie in too little 
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been 
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man con-
victed. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear 
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that 
obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecution of crime.1 
The time has come, I believe, when the nation should 
face up to the hard task of considering an amendment 
to the self-incrimination clause that will preserve all the 
Framers said and some of the Court's extensions, modify 
* A.B. 1935, M.A. 1948, J.D. 1951, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Professor of Law, University of Cali-
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37 
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1. Justice Hand, in United States v. 
Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. [1923]). 
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others, expunge some altogether, and guard against 
accretions seemed to be in the making. 2 
Recently one of my favorite TV performers said: "I hate 
to look in a mirror. I realize I am a schnook." Our Supreme 
Court justices are human beings. Why won't some of them 
look in the mirror? Why don't they realize that they are 
parts of Supreme Courts not SUPREME Courts? I had a 
number of barbs removed from last year's article by the 
then editor, a good friend of mine. One of them was a ref-
erence to a poem by Robert Burns: 
Oh wad some power the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as others see us! 
It wad frae many a blunder free us, 
An' foolish notion. 
Where are we going? Some of us remember the old 
Washington, D.C. We went there with our high school grad-
uation class. High school classes went to Washington (well-
chaperoned, of course), stayed at cheap hotels and had a 
wonderful time seeing the cherry blossoms and Mr. Hoover's 
Justice Department, sneaking kisses, buying pimple cures, etc. 
Those were the good old days. They are gone. Today, the 
high schools ignore the "great" city. It is a dangerous place 
for teenagers. Rape and robbery are rampant. Banks are 
robbed under the eaves of the White House. The Supreme 
Court sends home with bodyguards its secretaries who work 
after dark. 
A hotel clerk or door attendant in Washington will prac-
tically beg you not to go out after dark. In fact it is somewhat 
dangerous to ride a bus in the daytime at least in some areas. 
San Francisco and Los Angeles have not quite reached this 
point. But they are on the way. Washington is practically 
a dead city at night. If you have to visit a big city go to 
Chicago. Mayor Daley and his police force apparently have 
it under control. It is still fairly safe to wander Chicago 
streets at night. 
2. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment tional Change, Lecture, Univ. of Cin-
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu- cinnati College of Law, Nov. 6, 1968. 
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And what of the latest crime statistics? Incidentally, I 
am a little upset with our California Bureau of Criminal 
Statistics for being so apologetic concerning its statistics. 
They have done an outstanding job and should never apol-
ogize. There can be little doubt that our Bureau keeps the 
best crime statistics in the world. This has, been true for a 
long time. What do these statistics show? In a few sentences 
I am going to use them to demonstrate that the crime situation 
in California is tragic. 
In 1954, the year before People v. Cahan,S the year before 
the California Supreme Court started to "lead" us into "liberal-
ism," the crime index for major crimes per 100,000 persons 
in California was 1062.4 By 1967, the latest available year, 
it has risen to 2435.8 per 100,000. In other words for each 
100,000 persons in California in 1967, over 2400 major 
crimes were committed. To put it another way, for each 100 
persons in California 2t major felonies were committed-
serious felonies-murder, force able rape, robbery, burglary, 
aggravated assault, larceny or auto theft. Or to put it still 
another way one out of every 40 persons in California, count-
ing infants and old age pensioners, committed a serious felony 
in 1967. 
I use the year of the Cahan case for comparison, because 
that is the year that the California Supreme Court went to 
work to become a far-out liberal court. Since then there 
has been nothing but trouble. 
Consider some other statistics from our state figures. Fel-
ony arrests for all (not major) felonies have only risen from 
487 per 100,000 in 1954 to 708.9 per 100,000 in 1967. To 
state this another way felony arrests have risen 45 % since 
1954 on the basis of population. Major crimes on the other 
hand have gone up 135% on the same basis-three times as 
fast as arrests. We are without doubt losing the crime war! 
3. 44 Ca1.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 50 Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 
A.L.R.2d 513 (1955). Crime in California 1954 and Califor-
4. The statistics and calculations nia, Department of Justice, Bureau of 
based upon them used in this article Criminal Statistics, Crime and Delin-
come from California, Department of quency in California, 1967. 
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It is difficult to find figures in comparing these various 
reports that show anything which is not unfavorable. In 
1967 there were 265,780 reported burglaries and 6962 felony 
burglary convictions. Realizing that the same burglaries do 
not necessarily take place the year of the trials, the statistics 
seem to show that for every 38 reported burglaries, there is 
only one conviction. Similar statistics show only one convic-
tion for every 12 robberies. 
Population in California since 1954 has been increasing 
4% a year. Major crimes have been increasing 19% a year, 
almost five times as fast as the population increase. 
Who should we blame for all of this? I think this article 
demonstrates that a major part of the problem belongs to 
our supreme courts. Permissiveness is not only a problem 
of principals and parents and deans and trustees and regents 
and chancellors and college presidents and university presi-
dents. It is not only a problem of disgusted and frustrated 
policemen who sometimes turn their backs on crime. It is 
not only a problem of the so-called silent majority. It is the 
problem of us all, but especially appellate courts which are 
next to it. I realize that I am tilting at windmills, but perhaps 
a few people will get mad as a result of this article. We 
frightened a few supreme court justices at the last judicial 
election. Perhaps next time we can scare them again. In any 
event, hopefully, they will not become too complacent. Some 
of them are certainly not representing their constituents. 
The first ten amendments of the United States Constitution, 
as everyone knows, were intended to protect citizens of the 
newly formed federalist states from machinations of federal 
bureaucrats. However, in 1868, a curve was thrown called 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This provided in part that a 
person could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out "due process" of law. By twisting and torturing "due 
process," the United States Supreme Court with some assist-
ance from state courts, especially in California, has quite 
effectively deprived all state citizens of the protection of the 
first ten amendments. We now in effect have federal criminal 
procedure, as declared by the United States Supreme Court-
580 CAL LAW 1969 
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often by the familiar five to four decisions-running and ruin-
ing state criminal procedures. 
In California this process is often accelerated by an eager 
majority of our Supreme Court. The majority seems to want 
Washington to run California criminal procedure. They like 
the trend to Washington dictatorship. They even try to 
anticipate the United States Supreme Court and be the leaders 
in destroying state's rights in criminal procedure.5 
Enough of thatl 
It might be of some interest to know what the problem is 
in preparing an article such as this. In connection with its 
preparation. I screened all United States Supreme Court 
decisions as well as all California decisions which per-
tained to the subject. Two research assistants who perhaps 
did not know I was checking on them did the same job. I 
very carefully examined their "rejects" and reinstated some 
20% for further examination. They were usually right. It is 
not always easy for a law student (or a law professor for that 
matter) to know a "good" case when he sees one. 
I carefully read all relevant United States Supreme Court 
criminal procedure decisions. Many of them state California 
law. I decided, however, not to discuss them. Rather I cited 
them in notes. 
California Supreme Court decisions of course must be read 
and reread. There were approximately 80. Courts of appeal 
decisions ran over 600. Half of the reported decisions in 
California this year are criminal law and criminal procedure 
decisions. Half of the pages in the reports are criminal law 
and criminal procedure decisions. I started to keep talleys, 
but did not complete them. This year, like last year, I decided 
to cover the decisions extensively, rather than intensively. 
I probably missed decisions which should have been dis-
cussed. If I did, call them to my attention, and they will 
be mentioned next year. If some fine young lawyer would 
like to be a part of this project, let him contact me. It is 
not easy. 
5. See discussion Cal Law Trends and 
Developments 1967, p. 386. 
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Probably some who read the article last year wonder why 
there were only 80 California Supreme Court criminal law 
and procedure decisions this year as against 100 last year. 
I think it is because there was but one death penalty decision, 
where the degree of the murder was reduced. The court 
held back on the death penalty cases until it could decide 
the constitutionality of the death penalty. This it did, but 
after the end date for this article which was September 30, 
1968.6 
Wouldn't it be nice if the courts of appeal would observe 
California Rules of Court 976(b) which purports to forbid 
publication of opinions which do not involve new and impor-
tant issues of law, changes in established principles of law, 
or matters of general public interest? Many of their deci-
sions are junk. We have all become used to throwing junk 
mail in the scrap basket. I suppose we can learn to throw 
junk decisions in the same place. My children enjoy them. 
They are very helpful in kindling a fire in the fireplace. 
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Penal Code Revision Project 
was published this year.7 The draft is extensive and would 
update the present archaic penal code to a considerable 
extent. Some of the suggestions will be discussed from time 
to time in the course of this article. The draft would make 
it a defense if a person as a result of mental illness "lacked 
substantial capacity to know or understand what he was 
doing was wrong." At first glance this sounds like a change 
in the law, but when read with People v. Wolff,S it quickly 
becomes apparent that it is not. 
In the attempt statute the draftsmen propose to modernize 
the law of attempt and do away with archaic notions that 
for attempt there must be something dangerously near to 
completion of the offense. Under our present day notion 
of criminal law, a person who attempts a crime is as dangerous 
as a person who completes it. Both must be subjected to 
6. In re Anderson, 69 Ca1.2d -, 73 8. 61 Ca1.2d 795, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 
Cal.Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117 (1968). 394 P.2d 959 (1964). 
7. Joint Legislative Committee for 
Revision of the Penal Code, Tentative 
Draft No.2 (1968). 
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confinement where necessary. The proposed revision would 
move what is now attempt far back into the area of prepara-
tion. Lying in wait, reconnoitering, collecting materials to 
commit a crime, could constitute an attempt. There need 
be no clear and present danger that the crime would be com-
pleted. 
It is hoped that many California lawyers, judges as well 
as laymen will send their comments on the draft to the project 
director, Professor Arthur H. Sherry, University of California, 
Berkeley, that is, assuming the pickets allow the mail to go 
through. 
Criminal Procedure 
Pretrial Procedure 
Investigation. 9 The United States Supreme Court this year 
"discovered" and approved "stop and frisk." In Terry v. 
Ohio1o the court approved a limited search for weapons in 
a legitimate investigation where the peace officer, although 
without reasonable grounds to make an arrest, is justified 
in believing that the person being investigated is armed and 
dangerous to the officer or others. In Sib ron v . New Y orkll 
(two cases), the court upheld the New York "stop and frisk" 
law, reversing in one case because the peace officer did not 
have sufficient grounds to warrant a belief that the suspect 
was armed and dangerous. 
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Sibron suggests 
that the court has laid down an important new development 
in the law. However, almost simultaneously with its adoption 
of the exclusionary rule in 1955, the California Supreme 
Court determined that events short of reasonable cause for 
arrest may justify investigation. 
9. Two important eavesdropping de-
cisions were Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 
507 (1967) and Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 
378, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166, 88 S.Ct. 2096 
(1968); see, also, Comment, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Pre-Arrest In-
Furthermore, such circum-
vestigations, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1031 
(1968). 
10. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 
S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
11. 392 U.S. 40, 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 
88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968). 
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stances may also justify a "frisk" or "patting down" for 
weapons.12 Some recent decisions illustrating applications 
of the doctrine as well as some of its pitfalls are cited in 
the footnote. 13 One interesting loser was Sanchez.14 He, a 
suspected dope peddler, was seen to go into a pedestrian 
tunnel several different times with different persons, always 
coming out the same end of the tunnel he had first used. 
Officers entered both ends of the tunnel and accosted him. 
He immediately reached into his pocket. The officer, fearing 
Sanchez was going for a weapon, grabbed his hand which 
was found to contain a box of narcotics. He also was armed. 
His main contention was that he was confined without prob-
able cause at the time the officers entered both ends of the 
tunnel. The court upheld the arrest, search and seizure. 
Can a defendant represented by counsel of his own choice 
fail to object to his confessions at three trials and then on 
habeas corpus claim that they were involuntary despite his 
abandonment of an appeal? The supreme court held by a 
four to three decision that he can.15 The murder and mutila-
tion of the victim took place sometime before midnight. The 
defendant had been drinking but a finding that his first con-
fession at 1 a.m. was voluntary was upheld by the supreme 
court. However, he made three later confessions ten, fifteen, 
and twenty hours later which the majority thought should 
have been excluded. Shortly after the first confession he was 
given a large dose of a tranquilizer (thorazine) because of emo-
tional upset. There was some evidence that the combination 
of thorazine and alcohol might increase the effects of alcohol 
as well as slow down recovery from its effects. However, his 
own expert testified that he could not state that the defend-
ant's free will was destroyed, and that the defendant had the 
ability to choose whether he would answer questions or not. 
12. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 46 
Cal.2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); People 
v. Blodgett, 46 Cal.2d 114, 293 P.2d 
57 (1956). 
13. People v. Britton, 264 Cal. App. 
2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1968); Peo-
ple v. Nunn, 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 
584 CAL LAW 1969 
Cal. Rptr. 869 (1968); People v. Rice, 
259 Cal. App.2d 399, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
246 (1968). 
14. People v Sanchez, 256 Cal. App. 
2d 700, 64 Cal. Rptr. 33 J (1967). 
15. In re Cameron, 68 Ca1.2d 487, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633 (1968). 
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There was ample evidence that the defendant exercised his 
own judgment in making all three of the questioned confes-
sions. The trial judge so found. The referee so found. And 
the three dissenting justices so found. In fact a reading of 
the majority opinion leaves one wondering whether they really 
felt they had grounds for reversal. Another murderer goes 
free. However, since his first confession was held to be vol-
untary, perhaps he can be retried. 
The courts have practically destroyed the use of the line-up 
(sometimes called showup or identification parade). The 
Supreme Court has invented a "due process" right to have 
counsel at the line-up.I6 It has also held that the line-up must 
be fair, that is, not unnecessarily suggestive.1'1 Small wonder 
that one police department which was a model for a well-
known TV program has done away with the line-up alto-
gether. Doubtless it will struggle along with a less fair de-
vice-showing mugshots of suspects to witnesses. These of 
course provide prison pictures complete with numbers, prison 
haircuts, and front and side views. The witness will be told 
to ignore the numbers and consider the pictures on their merits. 
I have no doubt that there have been abuses in the use of the 
line-up. It is not always easy on short notice to find several 
persons who resemble the suspect. But should this investiga-
tive tool be destroyed altogether? Perhaps we will soon see 
a decision where the courts will hold that there was a denial 
of due process because no line-up was held. 
Other police forces continue to use the line-up but have 
developed policies which make it rather difficult to use. Fur-
thermore, agile defense counsel look for defects in the policies 
for the purpose of testing possible technical flaws and thereby 
freeing the guilty. The courts are not alone in freeing the 
guilty. 
I asked one distinguished defense attorney what he does 
with the new rule that created a right for the defendant to 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 17. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 
388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967). 
S.Ct. 1926 (1967); Gilbert v. Califor-
nia, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 
87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967). 
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have counsel present at the line-up. He said: "I go." I asked 
what he did while he was there. He said: "I sit." Of course 
he is we]] paid for his services. I wonder what the reaction 
is of public defenders and other court appointed counsel who 
are called at 3 a.m. to attend a line-up. 
As might be expected we see the effects of the line-up 
cases in our courts. One important decision was People v. 
Caruso18 where the supreme court held that the line-up was 
unnecessarily suggestive. Apparently the other participants 
in the line-up did not closely resemble the suspect. He was 
a very distinctive appearing person. The facts occurred before 
the newly created doctrines of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall 
v. Denno. 19 The poor policemen should have hired a mind 
reader to anticipate those decisions. One would doubt on 
reading the decision that the defendant can be tried again. 
Perhaps he will be captured (and freed again?) sometime in 
the future for some other offense. Meanwhile the police go 
on playing the game-if they don't get disgusted and resign. 
Who would want to be a cop in California? 
Or consider, People v. Espinoza Menchaca. 20 The line-up 
included a defendant of "Mexican extraction," and others who 
were not. Without ever seeing the witnesses or the others in 
the line-up and without discussing whether the defendant's 
"Mexican extraction" was apparent, the court reversed. How 
do you know if a person is of Mexican extraction? Such 
persons often look no different than anyone else. I am of 
Mexican extraction yet apparently no one ever noticed it. 
Perhaps my name is not a dead giveaway. But should I as-
sume the name Jose Antonia de Medina, the name of one 
of my forebears perhaps it would be required that others of 
such Mexican descent be placed in my line-up. Phooey! 
My skin is quite white and my eyes continue to be hazel. Many 
"Mexicans" have very white skin and blue, green, or hazel 
eyes. You can't categorize a person by his race, especially if 
you are on an appellate court where you don't see him. Why 
18. 68 Cal.2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 19. Cited notes 16 and 17, supra. 
336, 436 P.2d 336 (1968). For further 20. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. 
discussion of this case, see Harvey, Rptr. 843 (1968). 
EVIDENCE, in this volume. 
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can't appellate courts leave factual problems to the trial courts 
who see the witnesses? 
Again in People v. Hogan/ a "Negro" defendant was placed 
in a line-up with a "Mexican" and three "Caucasions." This 
was held to be a discriminatory line-up. Perhaps it was. But 
how does an appellate court know that a line-up is unfair? 
Why not leave this to the jury's determination of the weight 
of the evidence? They saw the witnesses. 
In any event these decisions and others should spell out 
guidelines to counsel. If the line-up is used the police must 
lean over backwards to make it fair. If a person of "Mexican" 
extraction, whatever that means, is placed in a line-up with 
"Caucasions," whatever that means, at least evidence should 
be placed in the record to show that they were similar in ap-
pearance. The victim must choose between similar persons. 
What should the police do for the time being? Perhaps 
they should forget about line-ups and show pictures to the 
victims. If so, they. should then consider eliminating prison 
identification numbers. How do they know what they should 
do? 
California Vehicle Code section 2814, recently adopted, 
permits roadblocks to inspect motor vehicles. A group of 
California Highway Patrol officers check vehicles for license, 
registration, brakes, lights, smog devices, etc. A mechanic 
checks the focus of headlights. In People v. De La Torre,2 
they noticed something else. This caused them to file a com-
plaint for a violation of the Vehicle Code section 23102 for 
driving while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. 
The trial judge ruled section 2814 unconstitutional and dis-
missed the complaint. The appellate department reversed as 
did the court of appeal. The per curiam decision contains a 
useful summary of the various roadblock cases.s 
1. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
448 (1968). 
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 162, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 804 (1967). 
3. See also, Comment, Interference 
with the Right to Free Movement: 
Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 
Cal. L. Rev. 907 (1963). This com-
ment by a law student gives the back-
ground of the problem and with 
Shepard's should enable anyone inter-
ested to become current. Decisions are 
scarce, perhaps because misdemeanor 
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Arrest, search and seizure. The plight of a peace officer 
who is trying to do his job and outguess the courts is a perplex-
ing one. Consider the saga of the Huntington Beach Police 
Department on Halloween night in 1966, which came to a 
tragic end in People v. Marshall. 4 My students wiIl probably 
nickname this the "trick-or-treat" case. 
The police used an informer to make a purchase of mari-
juana at an apartment. The transaction took place in the 
bedroom of the apartment, and the informer returned with a 
cellophane bag. The bag appeared to contain marijuana and 
smelled like a rum-soaked cigar. The informer said the packet 
came from a larger brown paper bag. Fearful of the possibil-
ity of having to break the front door which was an 8 foot slid-
ing glass door, they sent for a sergeant with instruments to pick 
the lock. They knocked several times and were not answered 
so they picked the lock.s They searched the apartment and 
found the occupants had gone out. As they walked through 
the house they smelled the same odor that they had smelled 
in the package procured by the informer (apparently rum-
soaked marijuana). 
Then came their fatal mistake. The smell seemed to come 
from the closet, the door of which was open. The smell also 
seemed to come from a brown paper bag in an open cardboard 
box. They discussed getting a search warrant, but rejected 
the idea as impracticable at 9 p.m. on a Sunday night. So 
they opened the bag and found 21 cellophane packages similar 
to the one brought to them by their informant. (The bag and 
contents were used as evidence.) They then sat down and 
awaited the return of the occupants of the apartment. Some 
were arrested, one being the defendant Marshal1.6 
The trial judge thought the evidence was admissible. But 
the court of appeal thought the evidence was inadmissible. 7 
Three supreme court justices thought the evidence was ad-
missible. However, four supreme court justices thought the 
convictions seldom find their way into 
appellate reports. 
4. 69 CaI.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 
442 P.2d 665 (1968). 
588 CAL LAW 1969 
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with Penal Code § 844. 
7. 64 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1967). 
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evidence was improperly seized. The judgment was re-
versed. Pity the poor peace officers. Their training in the 
law is somewhat limited. They act quickly and here 
acted quite reasonably. A very masterful job of police work 
was ruined. 
What went wrong? The officers should have obtained a 
search warrant before opening the brown bag. The majority 
quotes Johnson v. United StatesS to the effect that inconven-
ience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare 
papers and present them to the magistrate are not convincing 
reasons to by-pass the warrant requirement. 
Now let us follow the process of obtaining a hypothetical 
warrant under the facts of Marshall. Fortunately the apart-
ment was located not far from the police station so that little 
travel time would be involved. The district attorney in Orange 
County ordinarily does not permit peace officers to prepare 
warrants largely because most judges will not issue a warrant 
which has not been reviewed by a district attorney (and what 
district attorney would want it otherwise in view of the techni-
calities imposed by the appellate courts) . Therefore it would 
be necessary to find a deputy district attorney and a' stenogra-
pher. According to the district attorney's office: 
It is anybody's guess as to how many phone calls 
would have been made before finding a deputy at home 
and available. Most of the deputies lived in the county 
and would have been no farther than 45 minutes driving 
time from the Huntington Beach Police Department. 
The same procedure would have to be followed to locate 
a stenographer and a judge. Under ideal circumstances 
during office hours the average search warrant takes 
approximately 4 hours to complete. Adding to this the 
time required to locate a deputy district attorney who 
would in turn have to locate a stenographer and judge, 
the estimate of time involved would probably exceed 6 
hours.9 
8. 333 U.S. 10, 92 L.Ed. 436, 68 Deputy District Attorney, Orange 
S.Ct. 367 (1948). County, dated December 19, 1968 (em-
9. Letter from Michael R. Capizzi, phasis added). 
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Just what else would obtaining a search warrant on a Sunday 
night entail in Huntington Beach? First of all it would be 
necessary to keep two officers guarding the brown bag. Since 
they were waiting for several adults to return to the apartment 
it would have been dangerous to leave only one man. Thus 
a third officer would be needed to do the legwork necessary 
to get the warrant. On duty at the time were the watch 
commander at the police station, his sergeant, and five other 
officers. In other words what the majority is suggesting is 
that half of the officers in the field be immobilized. The 12,000 
souls of Huntington Beach are to be left at the mercy of 
Halloween vandals and other hoodlums with only the "pro-
tection" of three policemen. One bad automobile accident 
or holdup would immobilize at least two of the three. 
Assuming the quest for a warrant began at 10 p.m., the 
warrant could be procured no earlier than 4 a.m. Meanwhile, 
the occupants of the apartment and friends showed up. At 
10:55 p.m. four people showed up. One was arrested as 
being the owner of the apartment. Another was arrested as 
a juvenile in violation of curfew requirements. Who is to 
take them to the police station? This will necessitate the 
services of two of the three policemen still on duty in the city 
leaving one patrolman to guard the entire city. At 1 :30 a.m., 
the defendant and a friend appeared. The defendant was 
arrested. The friend was asked and agreed to go to the sta-
tion for a routine records check. The warrant has not ar-
rived. Once again two of the three policemen on duty must 
be used to take the two suspects to the police station. Finally, 
the warrant arrives and the two officers guarding the bag of 
marijuana are free to return to the station to write up their 
reports. lO All of this, the majority of the court refers to as 
"inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay!" 
10. Officer Hollingsworth who wrote and night patrol does not appear. He 
the reports finished up his stint late probably was, and should be proud of 
the next afternoon when the Orange what he had accomplished on that Hal-
County crime laboratory confirmed that loween night-even though the supreme 
the contents of the various packets were court pulled the rug out from under 
marijuana. Whether, after his 24 hour him. 
day, he then went back to his evening 
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Why must the peace officer go through this ceremonial rite 
of procuring a warrant? The majority explains that there is 
a difference between probable cause to believe that contra-
band will be found, which justifies issuance of a search war-
rant, and observation of contraband in plain sight which justi-
fies search without a warrant. The reason for the difference 
is that the magistrate is "neutral and detached" while the 
officer may be zealously engaged in "the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime." The majority blinds itself 
to the fact that quite a few California magistrates are laymen. 
Nor does it allude to the probability of some lack of neutrality 
and detachment even by a lawyer-magistrate suddenly awak-
ened at 3: 30 a.m. after a delightful evening of passing out 
goodies to trick-or-treaters. 
One possibility may be being overlooked by the law enforce-
ment people. The justices of the supreme court are all magis-
trates. ll It might be interesting for district attorneys who have 
supreme court justices in their counties to include them on 
the list of magistrates to call in the nighttime to authorize 
warrants. Surely, in view of the results in Marshall, at least 
four of the justices will be delighted to be awakened at 3:30 
a.m. to sign warrants. 
One other point made in Marshall is worthy of note. The 
majority analogized looking into the brown bag with the 
search made in Bielicki v. Superior Court.12 In Bielicki the 
officers looked down through a hole above toilets in a private 
amusement park and caught the defendants violating Penal 
Code section 286. The peeping was held to constitute an 
illegal search and seizure. Even if you find the brown bag, you 
must not peep without a warrant. Furthermore, merely be-
cause you smell something which in all probability is mari-
juana in the bag, you must wait until you explain the whole 
thing to a magistrate. Of course, the magistrate will not be 
able to smell the bag, but because of his neutrality and detach-
ment, he will be able to quiz you to find out if you were correct 
in your olifactory findings. The majority quips: "'In plain 
11. Penal Code § 808. 12. 57 Cal.2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 
371 P.2d 288 (1962). 
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smell,' . . . is plainly not the equivalent of 'in plain view.' " 
An officer properly on the premises can seize something he sees 
without the rubber stamp of the magistrate. His sense of 
smell must be reviewed by the magistrate. 
Miranda 13 problems, as might be expected, continued to 
arise. Perhaps the most outrageous decision was that in 
People v. Fioritto. 14 Defendant and two others burglarized 
a market. He was captured and brought into the police station 
and administered the standard Miranda warnings (or as Jack 
Webb's TV program puts it "given his rights"). However, he 
refused to sign a waiver of his rights. Thereafter he was con-
fronted by his juvenile accomplices both of whom had con-
fessed and implicated him. The accomplices after some dis-
cussion were taken out. Defendant again was advised of his 
rights and asked if he would like to sign the waiver. He then 
signed the waiver and confessed. 
The supreme court in a 5-2 decision held that by refusing 
to waive his rights initially, the privilege was invoked. Once 
invoked all further attempts at police interrogation should 
have ceased. One more obstacle was placed in the way of law 
enforcement. The court threw a small crumb to the peace 
officers when it declared, citing People v. Tomita,1s that where 
the defendant after asserting his constitutional rights there-
after initiates a confession, his voluntary statements can be 
utilized. 
Justice Burke, dissenting, relied on the purpose of Miranda 
which is the prevention of in-custody interrogation without 
advice of constitutional rights. He noted that in Miranda 
and companion cases no full and effective warning was 
given before interrogation. Here there were two warnings 
and a signed waiver. Furthermore, the defendant was a 
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). An inter-
esting recent U.S. Supreme Court case 
is Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 
1, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 
(1968), where the court held that "cus-
tody" for the purposes of Miranda in-
cludes custody for an unrelated of-
592 CAL LAW 1969 
fense. Defendant was questioned while 
in a state jail by a federal tax agent in 
the course of investigation of his civil 
tax liability. 
14. 68 Cal.2d 714, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 
441 P.2d 625 (1968). 
15. 260 Cal.App.2d 88, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
739 (1968). 
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parolee "somewhat sophisticated in the field of law enforce-
ment." Justice Burke thought that the notion that a voluntary 
statement must be initiated by the defendant is a novel inter-
pretation of Miranda. 
The court of appeal decisions in the Miranda area seem gen-
erally to show more awareness of the problems of law enforce-
ment than do those of the supreme courts. For example, in 
People v. Merchant,16 peace officers had a tip that defendant, 
an ex-convict, possessed a forbidden weapon. They talked to 
him through a locked screen door asking whether he was an 
ex-convict and whether he possessed a weapon which would 
be forbidden to an ex-convict under Penal Code section 12021. 
He answered both questions in the affirmative. The court 
held that he was not in custody and that the Miranda warnings 
did not have to be given at that point. 
A similar common sense result attained in People v. Sievers.17 
In that case the defendant was apprehended at Arizona by 
FBI agents and given Miranda warnings. The next day he 
was questioned by a San Francisco policeman who did not 
so warn him. He made admissions which were used against 
him in evidence. The court, in dictum, declared that no more 
than one adequate warning need be given by a person who 
may be subject to successive interrogation. IS 
At the rate things are going, the time will probably come 
when peace officers will have to advise persons committing 
crimes in their presence of their constitutional rights. For-
tunately, that time has not yet arrived. A police officer in 
plain clothes observed the attempt of a bartender to close his 
bar at 2 a.m. The defendant was in the doorway trying to 
embrace the bartender. As she left the bar she approached 
the officer and asked if he would like to go to a sex party 
where there would also be "pot." He went with her to her 
16. 260 Cal. App.2d 875, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 459 (1968). 
17. 255 Cal. App.2d 34, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 841 (1967). 
18. It is not clear whether the FBI 
agents asked any questions or whether 
he declined to discuss his case with 
38 
them. If so, the later Supreme Court 
decision in Fioritto would have come 
into play. Furthermore, the decision 
may be inconsistent with People v. 
Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
363, 424 P.2d 947 (1967) discussed in 
Cal. Law 1967, at p. 377. 
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apartment. Another officer followed and was also invited in. 
To make a long story short she collected marijuana cigarettes 
in her apartment and started away with the officers in an 
unmarked police car. When she started to smoke a "joint" 
she was arrested and advised of her rights at which time she 
produced other marijuana from her purse. She claimed that 
the act of smoking the marijuana while in "custody" was an 
admission and that she should earlier have been advised of 
her Miranda rights. By way of dictum the court said that 
smoking the marijuana was not an admission or confession 
but the criminal act itself. Under such circumstances Miranda 
warnings are not required.19 
In People v. Cheatham20 the court felt it necessary to state 
that a non-peace officer who makes a citizen's arrest need 
not advise the arrestee of his Miranda rights. 
A recurring as well as a troublesome problem raised by 
Miranda and its ilk, is the problem of driving while under the 
influence of an intoxicating beverage. Ent v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles1 is illustrative. Ent, an attorney, was arrested 
for driving while under the influence. She declined to submit 
to a chemical test of her blood, breath or urine as required 
by Vehicle Code section 13353. She demanded that an at-
torney be present during the test. No test was ever made. In 
accordance with the statute the department suspended her 
operator's license for 6 months. The superior court granted 
a writ of mandate which ordered the setting aside of the sus-
pension. She contended that her refusal to take the test was 
not a refusal but a request to delay until her counsel could be 
present. The court of appeal rejected her contention relying 
on various decisions including People v. Sudduth. 2 It also 
pointed to the well known fact that the probative value of a 
19. People v. Marinos, 260 Cal. App. 
2d 735, 67 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1968). 
20. 263 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
679 (1968). 
1. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
726 (1968). 
2. 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 
594 CAL LAW 1969 
421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. den. 389 U.S. 
850, 19 L.Ed.2d 119, 88 S.Ct. 43, dis-
cussed in Cal. Law 1967, at p. 393. 
The court in Sudduth held: "Suspects 
have no constitutional right to refuse 
a test designed to produce physical evi-
dence in the form of a breath sample 
whether or not counsel is present." 
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chemical test for intoxication diminishes with the passage of 
time. She also made a rather outlandish contention that the 
officer should give her some warning analogous to the Miranda 
warnings to the effect that she had no right to counsel at 
the time of the test.3 This also was rejected. The peace 
officers can't lose them all! 
The problem of required formalities for arrest continues 
to arise. People v. Rosales4 represents a significant limita-
tion on the exceptions to the requirement that the formalities 
of Penal Code section 844 be complied with before making 
an arrest without a warrant. Section 844 requires that the 
officers demand admittance and announce the purpose for 
which it is desired before breaking in. The arrest, which 
took place at night was for parole violation. A possible 
escape attempt was anticipated since the defendant had 
absconded before. There was also a fear that defendant 
and his confederate, also a parole violator, would resist arrest. 
The officers identified themselves to a girl visible through 
the open door before they moved in and arrested defendant 
with heroin on his person. In another of the familiar 7-4 
decisions (seven if you count the trial judge, the court of 
appeal and the three dissenting judges), a slim majority 
reversed a conviction for possession of heroin. 
Fortunately the basis for the majority decision was section 
844, not the Constitution, although the majority did note 
that the section is designed to protect fundamental rights. 
"Even an escape from custody . . . does not alone justify 
entrance into a house" without compliance with the section. 
The majority relies on Miller v. United Statel which up to 
now would have been deemed irrelevant in California because 
that case was based on an interpretation of a federal statute. 
The least that can be said for Rosales is that it represents 
3. She relied upon People v Ellis, 65 
Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 
393 (1966), discussed in Trends and De-
velopments 1967, at p. 394, which was 
distinguished by the court. 
4. 68 Ca1.2d 299, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
437 P.2d 489 (1968). 
S. 357 U.S. 301, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 78 
S.Ct. 1190 (1958). A more recent de-
cision is Sabbath v. United States, 391 
U.S. 585, 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 88 S.Ct. 
1755 (1968). 
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another tightening of the thumbscrews on good police work. 
However, it also may be a bellweather for further restrictions 
in this area. Once again the majority of the court find 
themselves in a race to anticipate the United States Supreme 
Court and thereby makes themselves the leaders in "progres-
sive" criminal procedural developments.6 
Perhaps the result in People v. Gastelo7 makes more sense. 
This was a search warrant entry and the problem arose under 
Penal Code section 1531 which is similar to section 844, 
and treated as analogous by the court. Here there was a 
forced entry without any attempt to comply with the section 
at 8: 20 a.m. on a Saturday morning, the day after Christmas. 
The defendant and one Donna Grujillo were asleep in the 
bedroom at that time. The Attorney General, according to 
the court, contended that unannounced forcible entry is always 
reasonable to execute a search warrant in narcotics cases. 
This contention was rejected by a unanimous court. 
In the Marshall case already noted8 the officers had prob-
able cause to arrest the defendants in their apartment. The 
arrest was postponed briefly because of a dangerous glass 
door which the officers feared they might have to break 
through. Therefore they sent for an expert to pick the lock 
if necessary. They knocked several times and announced 
their identity. There was no response so the lock was picked 
and entry made. The court felt that this was substantial 
compliance with Penal Code section 844. This part of the 
decision seems far more sensible than Rosales. 
The problem of how much subterfuge can be employed 
by officers has occasionally troubled our supreme court some-
times with absurd results. For example, in People v. Reeves,9 
an anonymous informer told police that the defendant, a 
narcotics loser, had heroin and was staying at the St. George 
Hotel. One of the officers knew defendant had a prior con-
viction. They got him to open the door of his room on the 
6. Cf. Cal Law Trends and Del'elop- 8. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal.2d -, 
ments 1967, p. 367. 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 665 (1968). 
7. 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 9. 61 Cal.2d 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
432 P.2d 706 (1967). 391 P.2d 393 (1964). 
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ruse that there was a registered letter for him. They saw 
what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette, made the arrest 
and searched and seized other marijuana. This was held 
to be an illegal arrest, search, and seizure because of the 
ruse which was thought to amount to illegal "trickery, stealth 
or subterfuge." Seemingly, fighting crime is more like par-
ticipating in a boxing match than a war. The Marquis of 
Queensberry rules are in force. Officers must use gloves of 
the proper weight and never hurt the criminal too much. 
Peace officers must always be perfect gentlemen in their deal-
ings with hoodlums. 
In People v. Coleman,lo a more sensible result was reached. 
There was an arrest warrant for possession by the defendant 
of marijuana. The assistant manager of the hotel where 
defendant resided told the desk clerk to take the peace officers 
to defendant's room. The desk clerk took them to the room, 
rapped on the door, and said that it was the desk clerk without 
prompting by the officers. The defendant opened the door, 
was arrested and large quantities of narcotics seized. The 
court very carefully distinguished Reeves as a case where 
there was no warrant and not even probable cause. The 
court felt that the conduct of the officers was proper even 
if there had been subterfuge to get in the room as contended 
by the defendant. 
Two important arrest warrant decisions were handed down 
this year. At least since 1872 it has been customary in draft-
ing complaints to "track" or follow the words of the statute. 
Penal Code section 952 authorizes this. Section 813 provides 
that if the magistrate is satisfied "from the complaint that 
the offense complained of has been committed and that there 
is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has com-
mitted it" he must issue an arrest warrant. The United States 
Supreme Court in Giordenello v. United Statesll held that a 
complaint which merely states the affiant's conclusions in the 
words of the statute cannot support a valid arrest warrant. 
This was stated to be applicable to the states in Aguilar v. 
10. 263 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 11. 357 U.S. 480, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 78 
910 (1968). S.Ct. 1245 (1958). 
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Texas. 12 It was a foregone and predictable18 conclusion that 
when faced with the question, the California Supreme Court 
would hold that the customary practice in California of merely 
stating the words of the statute is unconstitutional. This it 
did in People v. Sesslin.14 A complaint must state facts to 
support the complainant's belief that the defendant committed 
the alleged felony. Furthermore, if it is based on information 
and belief, as is quite common, it must show facts relative 
to the identity or credibility of the source of such information 
and belief. 
This result was not reached without the dissent of three 
justices. They pointed out that Giordenello was based on a 
federal rule. This is true but a footnote in Aguilar makes it 
clear that Giordenello is applicable to the states under the 
14th Amendment. They also suggest that magistrates often 
informally interrogate the complainant at length. However, 
one may doubt that they always do this. For once, I have 
to side with the majority which seems bound by Giordenello 
and Aguilar. 
What are the implications of Sesslin? There seems no rea-
son to apply it only to felonies. Penal Code section 1427 
provides that if the magistrate is presented with a misdemeanor 
complaint and "is satisfied therefrom that the offense com-
plained of has been committed, and that there is reasonable 
ground to believe that the defendant has committed it" he 
must issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant. Once 
again the time honored practice with misdemeanor complaints 
is to track the statute. Doubtless at least some magistrates 
take their morning stack of complaints and warrants and sign 
them without even reading them. In any event in very few 
cases can they satisfy themselves "therefrom." There is insuf-
ficient information. 
12. 378 U.S. 108 at 112 fn. 3, 12 14. 68 Ca1.2d 418, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 
L.Ed.2d 723 at 727, 84 S.Ct. 1509 at 439 P.2d 321 (1968). For further dis-
- (1964). cussion of this case see Harvey, EVI-
13. Collings, Toward Workable Rules DENCE, in this volume. 
of Search and Seizure-An Amicus 
Curiae Brief, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 421, 455 
(1962). 
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What will be the effect of Sesslin? I suggested in an earlier 
article15 and again suggest that one may doubt that many mag-
istrates will intensify their perusal of complaints before issuing 
warrants. Prosecutors and others will be forced to be more 
careful in preparation of complaints. They will do more 
than repeat the statutory language especially where the basis 
of the complaint is information and belief. 
It would be a pity to stop using the short-form complaint. 
Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was 
amended as a result of Giordenello to provide that it must 
appear from the complaint, "or from an affidavit or affidavits 
filed with the complaint" that there is probable cause. Such 
a solution should be acceptable to the California courts even 
in the absence of an amendment of the statute. 
The number of consent to search cases reported each year 
since Cahan ranges between 10 and 15. The trend continues 
toward restricting peace officers in this area. The most 
important decision of the past year was another of the 4-3 
decisions in People v. Johnson. I6 There the peace officers 
had reliable information that one Cooper was selling nar-
cotics at a named hotel. They went to the hotel and as they 
approached Cooper's room he came out and was questioned. 
He was searched without any narcotics being found. Cooper, 
when asked if his room could be searched, gave the officers 
the key to the room. They entered and found defendant in 
possession of narcotics. The majority held that the search 
of Cooper was unlawful because information from an informer 
could not be used to show probable cause as the officers 
declined to name him. "The succeeding events were so inti-
mately connected with the officers' unlawful conduct that the 
evidence acquired must be held to be the result of that 
conduct." The majority declined to apply retroactively sec-
tion 1042 (c) of the Evidence Code which authorizes protec-
tion of the informer's identity, the principle of which was 
15. Collings, Toward Workable Rules 16. 68 Ca1.2d 629, 68 Cal. Rptr. 441, 
of Search and Seizure-An Amicus 440 P.2d 921 (1968). 
Curiae Brief, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 421, 455 
(1962). 
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upheld in McCray v. Illinois. 17 In any event the majority 
felt that there was insufficient showing of the underlying 
circumstances which showed the informer to be reliable. 
The dissent pointed out that the defense never relied at the 
trial on unlawful search of Cooper, nor was the matter 
argued on appeal. In any event the dissenters could see no 
illegal activity on the part of the officers. There was no 
overbearing conduct by the two officers. Cooper was not 
even arrested. 18 
In People v. Chimel/9 officers armed with Sesslin-type war-
rants were more successful. However, although the warrants 
were constitutionally insufficient, the prosecution sought in 
the trial court to justify the arrest independently of the war-
rant. The trial court found that there was probable cause 
based on the information the officer had at the time of the 
arrest. The supreme court affirmed with only Justice Peters 
dissenting. Thus, if there is any possibility that the warrant 
may be insufficient, the prosecutor still may be able to sustain 
a conviction if he shows in the trial court that the arresting 
officers had probable cause to make the arrest. 
The problem of seizure of contraband discovered in an 
inventory of the contents of a motor vehicle arose this year 
in the context of two automobile accidents where the defend-
ants had been disabled and hospitalized. In both cases the 
searches and seizures were upheld. 20 
The problem of a computer generated warrant arose in 
17. 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 87 
S.Ct. 1056 (1967). 
18. Other interesting consent cases 
include: People v. Linke, 265 Cal. 
App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1968) 
(wife's consent); People v. Cruz, 264 
Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 249 
(1968) (shoulder shrugging); Pierce v. 
Board of Nursing Education & Nurse 
Registration, 255 Cal. App.2d 463, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967) (female nurse 
living with male nurse on probation); 
People v. Lobikis, 256 Cal. App.2d 775, 
600 CAL LAW 1969 
64 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1967) (common 
law wife); Bumper v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 88 S.Ct. 
1788 (1968) (grandmother owned home 
searched and rifle seized). 
19. 68 Cal.2d 436, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421, 
439 P;2d 333 (1968). 
20. People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App.2d 
430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968); People v. 
Norris, 262 Cal. App.2d -, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 582 (1968); cf. discussion in Cal 
Law Trends and Developments 1967, 
at p. 371. 
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People v. Superior Court. 1 The defendant was cited for a 
traffic violation. He violated his promise to appear and the 
computer generated the warrant. A clerk affixed the mag-
istrate's facsimile signature and attached an IBM bail card. 
The magistrate never saw it. The peace officer was suspicious 
of a parked car and checked it out via radio and discovered 
the existence of the warrant. He also found narcotics. The 
superior court granted a motion to suppress under the new 
Penal Code section 1538.5 on the ground of the failure of 
the warrant to satisfy Penal Code sections 813 and 815.2 
The court of appeal granted a writ of prohibition to the pros-
ecutor, holding that there is no requirement that the magistrate 
make a section 813 determination of probable cause. The 
offense, failure to appear, occurred in his presence. The 
magistrate ordered a warrant issued at the time of the non-
appearance. There is no requirement, said the court, either 
in Vehicle Code section 40514 or Penal Code section 853.8 
(failure to appear) that the magistrate actually sign the 
warrant.3 
Pre-trial right to counsel. The case of In re Hawley4 
involves the problem of a plea bargain well handled by all 
concerned. The defendant after quite a bit too much to drink 
beat another man and set the building afire. He was charged 
with murder and arson. The autopsy revealed that the fire 
rather than the beating caused the death. He was examined by 
two psychiatrists who came up with conflicting reports. One 
thought he was mentally ill, as well as so drunk as not to 
know right from wrong. The other thought he was quite 
sane. The public defender entered into an agreement with 
the prosecution to the effect that the defendant would plead 
to first degree murder if the prosecutor would dismiss the 
1. 262 Cal. App.2d 283, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
629 (1968). 
2. It would appear that the applica-
ble section is § 1427. 
3. The court relies on the fact that 
the clerk's docket entry at the time of 
the nonappearance indicates that the 
magistrate ordered a warrant. What 
is there behind that statement? Did 
the clerk place before the magistrate 
one, five or fifty files relative to failure 
to appear. Did the magistrate read 
them all before ordering issuance of 
warrants? Should he have to? 
4. 67 Cal.2d 824, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831, 
433 P.2d 919 (1967). 
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arson charge and recommend life imprisonment. The de-
fendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On habeas 
corpus he claimed that the above facts showed lack of effective 
representation by counsel, relying on People v. Ibarra. 5 Al-
though Ibarra involved representation at a trial, the court 
thought the same principles apply to pretrial representation. 
However, the court felt that incompetence could not be shown. 
In view of the conflicting facts on the issue of diminished 
responsibility, the gruesome nature of the evidence, and ad-
mitted conduct which showed some evidence of premeditation 
and malice, there was a significant possibility of a death 
penalty had trial been held and the decision to plead to first 
degree murder with a life sentence was proper. 
The importance of full advice of right to counsel as well 
as full docket entries cannot be emphasized too much. In 
People v. Harris,6 the docket sheet relates that defendant 
requested counsel, but fails to show that he was advised of 
his right to appear with counselor, if indigent, to have ap-
pointed counsel. If he appeared without counsel the record 
should contain sufficient facts to show a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of counsel. Fortunately, in the case of Harris 
the defects were waived by his failure to object to them in 
a Penal Code section 995 motion. 
Grand jury. A superior court judge denied newspapers 
access to grand jury transcripts after the defendants were 
taken into custody. His apparent reasoning was that he 
had to insure a fair trial. The United States Supreme Court 
has gone over backward to prevent pUblicity from interfering 
with fair triaP Although it shows some awareness of the 
need for discovery by the defendant it has still been inclined 
to protect the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. 8 Cali-
5. 60 Cal.2d 460, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 
386 P.2d 487 (1963). 
6. 67 Cal.2d 866, 64 Cal. Rptr. 313, 
434 P.2d 609 (1967), app. dismd. 391 
U.S. 603, 20 L.Ed.2d 848, 88 S.Ct. 
1867; see also, In re Wells, 67 Cal.2d 
873, 64 Cal. Rptr. 317, 434 P.2d 613 
(1967), as well as In re Smiley, 66 
Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 
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179 (1967) and the discussion in Cal 
Law Trends and Developments 1967 
at p. 382. 
7. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 85 S Ct 1628 
(1965). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Proctor 
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,2 L.Ed.2d 
1077, 78 S.Ct. 983 (1958); see, also, 
26
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 22
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/22
Criminal Law and Procedure 
fornia, on the other hand, has gone the other way and given 
the defendant a right to the transcript of the grand jury 
proceedings which lead to his indictment.9 How do you solve 
the dilemma? The court of appeal in Craemer v. Superior 
CourtlO resolved it in favor of pUblicity. However, the de-
fendant would have a reasonable time after receipt of the 
transcript to object to disclosure of inadmissible matter. 
Pre-trial motions. ll There have been a number of decisions 
on various aspects of the operation of the new motion to sup-
press procedure, section 1538.5. They do not appear worthy 
of mention here and can casily be found by standard research 
techniques. From a reading of these decisions it appears that 
the new procedure is off to a satisfactory beginning. 
Maine v. Superior Court12 involves the problem of change 
in venue where there is a combination of an atrocious crime, 
considerable publicity in a fairly small county, and the fact 
that the defendants were strangers to the country. Maine 
and Braun kidnapped a young couple, murdered the boy, 
raped the girl, beat her until they apparently thought she 
was dead, then hurled her body over a cliff. They were 
charged with murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault with intent 
to commit murder. They moved under Penal Code section 
1033 for a change of venue on the ground that a fair and 
impartial trial could not be had in Mendocino County (popu-
lation 51,000). The trial court denied the motion. The 
defendants sought a writ of mandate to direct a change of 
venue. 
Preliminarily the supreme court had to determine whether 
mandate would lie to compel a change of venue. The court 
Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Un-
reasonable Rule oj Secrecy, 48 Va. L. 
Rev. 668 (1962). 
9. Penal Code § 938.1. 
10. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 193 (1968). 
11. See, Bruton v. United States, 391 
U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.C!. 
1620 (1968), relative to the problem of 
joinder of two defendants where one 
has confessed. 
In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 
20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 88 S.Ct. 1921 (1968), 
the court held that the Bruton rule is 
applicable to the states under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Furthermore, the 
Bruton rule must be applied retroactive-
ly. 
12. 68 Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 
438 P.2d 372 (1968). 
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after lengthy discussion and noting that mandate had not 
been employed previously in this situation upheld its use. It 
weighed the problem of protecting the right to a fair trial 
against the burdens of going through a trial and raising the 
issue on appeal. By way of dictum it suggests that the appli-
cation for mandate should be made in advance of the trial 
not during or after impaneling the jury. A motion for change 
of venue can still be made at those stages of the procedure 
and error on appeal predicated on denial of such motions. 
The court noted that mandate normally lies to control 
abuses rather than exercises of discretion. But in the case 
of this new use of mandate, Sheppard v. MaxweZ[13 requires 
the court to make an independent evaluation of the circum-
stances and satisfy itself that the defendant obtains a fair and 
impartial trial. 
The court then proceeded to evaluate the circumstances 
and ruled unanimously that venue should be changed prob-
ably to a metropolitan county. There were other circum-
stances mentioned by the court in addition to the facts earlier 
set forth. The victims were a popular teen-age couple from 
respected families. A fund had been established to defray 
the girl's medical expenses and a local paper was urging all 
to contribute. A large fund was raised mostly from modest 
contributions. Although the sheriff and district attorney had 
been "extremely close-mouthed," others, including a state of 
Washington official (the defendants also committed crimes in 
that state), had revealed the fact that one defendant had 
confessed. The district attorney had disqualified the trial 
judge whom one defense counsel was opposing for re-election. 
Hopefully, the court will be sparing in its use of mandate 
in such cases. Maine and Braun were tried in San Jose, some 
170 odd miles from Ukiah, the Mendocino County seat. The 
prosecutor and his assistants and defense counsel (I believe 
they were court appointed) must be transported to San Jose 
and paid per diem while there. The same is true of the wit-
nesses. The prosecutor's operations suffer by his absence. No 
13. 384 U.s. 333, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 
86 s.Ct. 1507 (1966). 
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doubt he spends his evenings trying to prepare his case for 
the next day and answering long distance phone calls from 
his office. He spends his weekends back in Ukiah. But after 
all there are 168 hours in a week. 
A stalling ploy often resorted to by the sophisticated con 
is a last minute decision to discharge his court appointed 
counsel and go ahead on his own. He asks for a continuance 
and when the case is called for trial, he may later "realize" 
his inadequacies and asks that counsel again be appointed and 
for another continuance. Perhaps the food is better in county 
jails than in San Quentin. Who knows? If the motion is 
granted, the sixty or so persons on the jury panel have to be 
sent home. 
In People v. Maddox14 the defendant repeatedly asked that 
he be permitted to represent himself. On more than one 
occasion his appointed counsel, the public defender, also asked 
to be relieved. The motions were denied on the last occasion 
with the prospective jurors sitting in the court room. The 
trial judge excused the public defender and proceeded with 
the trial despite defendant's claim that he was not ready 
because he had insufficient opportunity to use the law library 
and subpoena witnesses. He declined to state what would 
be the testimony of the witnesses he desired to subpoena. 
The court thereupon commenced to impanel the jury and 
denied a motion for a continuance of 60 days. The trial 
proceeded and defendant was convicted of the crimes charged 
-battery and attempted escape. The supreme court allowed 
itself to be suckered into a reversal on the ground that the 
trial judge should have granted a continuance to give the 
defendant time to prepare his case for trial. Only Justice 
McComb dissented. 
What is a proper solution of this problem? The defendant 
is informed in the inferior court of his right to counsel. He 
is again informed of this right when he comes before the 
superior court. Perhaps he should also be informed that 
he not only has a right to proceed with or without counsel, 
14. 67 Cal.2d 647, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371, 
433 P.2d 163 (1967). 
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but that if he elects to proceed with counsel, without good 
cause being shown, he will not be granted a continuance if 
he later elects to proceed without counsel. Isn't it about time 
that the courts cease letting the con-wise make monkeys out 
of them? 
Trial preparation. A perennial problem is the procuring 
of foreign, that is, out of state, witnesses. The Uniform Act 
to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without the State 
in Criminal Cases (Penal Code sections 1334-1334.6) has 
been in force since 1937. It has its problems. However 
you obtain a foreign witness, it is expensive and will affect 
the budget. When must the court call him? When can it 
get along with his testimony at the preliminary examination, 
etc.? 
A rare case came before the supreme court this year. In 
People v. Cavanaugh15 the defense was alibi, that the defend-
ant was in Boston at the time of the crime. The defendant 
wanted to bring eleven witnesses from Massachusetts to testify 
to his alibi. The trial judge ruled that the number of witnesses 
was out of proportion to realities and asked reconsideration. 
Defense counsel was permitted to submit written interroga-
tories to the witnesses, who were examined by the Boston 
public defender. Defense counsel then moved that four wit-
nesses be brought from Massachusetts. The trial judge 
announced he would allow two witnesses to be brought. Coun-
sel selected two and testimony of others was read to the jury. 
The court, recognizing an equal protection issue, held that 
its problem was primarily one of determining whether the 
trial judge properly exercised his discretion. After noting 
that the testimony of the absent witnesses, was either vague 
or cumulative, held that the trial judge had properly exercised 
his discretion. 
Another decision under the Uniform Act is also worthy of 
note. In People v. WOOdS16 the court noted that under Evi-
15. 69 Cal.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438, Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 88 
444 P.2d 110 (1968). S.C!. 1318 (1968). In Barber v. Page, 
16. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. the Court, after noting that it is often 
Rptr. 583 (1968); see also, Barber v. possible to procure the attendance of 
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dence Code section 1291(a), the fact that a witness is out 
of the state is not enough to make his former testimony (here 
a preliminary transcript) admissible since his testimony can 
be compelled by process. However, the defendant did not 
object to the use of the transcript and therefore waived any 
rights to have its use reviewed on appeal. 
Whether criminal discovery belongs here I do not know. 
However, two important cases should be mentioned some-
where. 17 People v. Russel/8 involved the Ballard19 problem. 
Defendant was charged with violations of Penal Code sections 
285 (incest) and 288, the alleged victim being his daughter. 
After a mistrial because of failure of the jury to reach a verdict, 
the defendant was granted an order that the child be exam-
ined by a psychiatrist to determine whether her mental or 
emotional condition affected her veracity. Apparently the 
psychiatrist talked to her for 20 minutes. 2o The trial judge 
in the second trial declined to admit the "evidence." The 
supreme court felt that the record did not sufficiently show 
the basis for the trial judge's exercise of his discretion and 
therefore it resolved that question in favor of the defendant. 
Ballard, it said, requires liberal exercise of discretion in such 
cases in favor of the defendant. Failure of the trial judge 
to state his reasons for his ruling requires reversal. (All one 
has to do to understand his reasons is to read the report.) 
Hopefully, the prosecutor will try again. The still unanswered 
question is who is going to analyze the psychiatrists, who 
under decisions like Russel, Ballard, and the diminished re-
sponsibility cases, unquestionably invade the province of the 
jury? 
In People v. Garcia/ the supreme court by another of its 
out-of-state witnesses under modern 
procedures, stated that mere absence of 
a witness is insufficient ground for us-
ing his preliminary testimony at the trial 
unless the prosecutor has made a good-
faith effort to obtain his presence. 
17. See also, Smith v. Illinois, 390 
U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 88 S.Ct. 748 
(1968), relative to discovery of the 
name of an informer. 
18. 69 Cal.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210, 
443 P.2d 794 (1968). 
19. Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 
Ca1.2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 
838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1966). 
20. His brief report is quoted in note 
7 of the opinion. 
1. 67 Ca1.2d 830, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110, 
434 P.2d 366 (1967). 
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4-3 decisions, actually by dictum, gutted Evidence Code 
section 1042 (c). The informants in a narcotics case accord-
ing to the majority were not participants or eyewitnesses. 
However, there was a "possibility" that they might support 
defendant's case. The majority's speculation as to these 
"possibilities" must be read to be believed. The test is whether 
their evidence "might" result in exoneration of the defendants. 
If there is a "possibility" that the informer's evidence "might" 
help the defendant, disclose his name. The very strong "pos-
sibility" that he "might" be murdered is not worthy of con-
sideration. These informers did not participate in or witness 
the transaction. They were not present when the evidence 
was seized and the arrest was made. They made no accusa-
tion against the defendant, but only against individuals involv-
ing premises not under control of the defendant. In fact 
there is no evidence that they knew or had ever heard of the 
defendant. Once again I suggest that the majority has gutted 
section 1042 ( c). It is predictable that the majority will 
frustrate other sections of the Evidence Code before it is 
through. 2 
Trial 
Trial by jury.3 This article will not discuss recent United 
States Supreme Court developments in trial by jury problems. 
2. Cf. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 
646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111 
(1968). 
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444 
(1968). When is there a right to trial 
by jury in minor crimes? Recent leg-
islation in California creates an of-
fense known as an infraction. Penal 
Code § 19c. A person charged with 
an infraction is not entitled to a right 
to trial by jury. This would appear to 
be constitutional under Duncan. 
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 20 
L.Ed.2d 522, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (1968). 
When is there a right to trial by jury 
for "criminal" contempts? What is a 
criminal contempt? See also, Dyke v. 
608 CAL LAW 1969 
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 
216, 20 L.Ed.2d 538, 88 S.Ct. 1472 
(1968). 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770 
(1968). When can a prospective mem-
ber of a jury in capital case be excused 
who is opposed to the death penalty? 
Implications of Witherspoon are tre-
mendous. Can you challenge them per-
emptorilY? Can you challenge "Mexi-
cans" when the defendant is Mexican? 
Can you challenge "Italians" when the 
defendant is Italian? Can you chal-
lenge naturalized citizens when the de-
fendant is naturalized and the case in-
volves immigration matters? The 
Court in Witherspoon just did not think 
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These will no doubt be in the forefront next year. The deci-
sions are cited in the notes, however. Perhaps it is worthy 
of note that the Supreme Court of California decided in 
People v. Harris,4 that the contention of an atheist that he 
should be allowed to exclude all jurors who believe in God 
is devoid of merit. 
Public trial. Decisions involving the right to public trial 
are rare but always interesting when they arise. One problem 
is to whom does the right to a public trial belong-defendant, 
prosecutor, public or press? Can the defendant request, with-
out objection of the prosecutor, closed proceedings to keep 
out the public and the press? Oxnard Publishing Co. v. 
Superior Coud involved a number of very peculiar circum-
stances. For example the court on request of the public 
defender prevented the prosecutor from commenting on wit-
nesses at a lineup in his opening statement. The judge in 
closed session heard all sorts of testimony (30 witnesses), 
visited the scene of the crime, and heard psychiatrist testi-
mony over a seven week period. A table listing the numerous 
closed hearings is included in the opinion. In any event the 
appellate court ordered the trial judge to vacate his closing 
order. The decision is a useful summary of the law in this 
area, even if the facts set forth are rather unsatisfactory. 
Competent counsel. Does a trial judge have the right to 
remove incompetent counsel over the objection of the defend-
ant? This was the issue in Smith v. Superior Court. 6 The 
trial judge relieved court appointed counsel in a murder case. 
The defendant objected and stated that he demanded that 
attorney and no other. The supreme court upheld this right. 
Admission to the bar establishes that the State deems an 
attorney competent to undertake the practice of law before 
all of the courts. The only court capable of action otherwise 
the problem through and came down 
with a very bad decision. It all goes to 
show that the Court is an inadequate 
legislature. See, also, Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L.Ed.2d 
797, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (1968). 
4. 67 Cal.2d 866, 64 Cal. Rptr. 313, 
39 
434 P.2d 609 (1967), app. dismd. 391 
U.S. 603, 20 L.Ed.2d 848, 88 S.Ct. 
1867. 
5. 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968), hearing 
granted, dismissed. 
6. 68 Ca1.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
440 P.2d 65 (1968). 
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is the supreme court. If the attorney is making mistakes to 
the prejudice of the client who wants him anyway, the judge's 
only remedy, if any, is to hold him in contempt. Query 
whether an attorney could be punished for contempt for his 
incompetence if unintentiona1.7 
Trial testimony. The practice in Southern California of 
trying a case on the record of the preliminary hearing has 
its advantages-but may also be a booby trap. In People v. 
Wheeler,s the trial went like this: 
In the superior court defendant was represented by 
private counsel. On June 20, 1966, defendant, in per-
son, waived his right to a jury trial. Counsel joined in 
the waiver. The prosecutor and defense counsel then 
entered a stipulation to submit the matter on the tran-
script of the preliminary hearing, subject to the right 
of both sides to call additional witnesses. Defendant did 
not personally participate in the stipulation or affirma-
tively indicate his assent thereto. 
The case came on for trial on June 30, 1966. The 
following is a complete copy of the transcript of the pro-
ceedings: "THE COURT: People versus Wheeler. Let 
the record show that the Court has read the entire tran-
script of the preliminary hearing in this case and has 
examined the exhibits. MR. LEWIS: The People rest. 
THE CLERK: Was there a submission here? THE 
COURT: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defense 
rests, your Honor. THE COURT: Do you want to 
argue it? MR. LEWIS: The People will submit the mat-
ter. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defense submits the 
matter, your Honor. THE COURT: I find the defend-
ant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, a lesser and 
necessarily included offense than that charged in the 
Information, assault with a deadly weapon with intent 
to commit murder. THE DEFENDANT: What! [DE-
7. See Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 8. 260 Cal. App.2d 522, 67 Cal. 
Cal.2d 755, 278 P.2d 681 (1955), cert. Rptr. 246 (1968). 
den. 350 U.S. 876, 100 L.Ed. 774, 76 
S.Ct. 121. 
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FENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the defendant waives 
time for sentence and requests leave of Court to file a 
written application for probation. THE COURT: The 
matter will be referred to the Probation Department. 
It will be set for hearing on probation and sentence on 
July 21st at 9: 30. The defendant is remanded to the 
custody of the Sheriff pending further hearing. THE 
DEFENDANT: You mean I have been tried? THE 
COURT: Certainly. You just got tried and were found 
guilty. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: A.D.W. THE DE-
FENDANT: Wait a minute. I haven't said a word. 
THE COURT: Take him out of here. THE DEFEND-
ANT: What is this? THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
Come here. This case was submitted on the transcript 
by your counsel. At the last hearing it was submitted 
on the transcript of the testimony taken at the prelim-
inary hearing and I have read the transcript, and on the 
basis of the testimony there I found you guilty, so you 
have had a trial. What are you complaining about? 
THE DEFENDANT: I haven't said a word. THE 
COURT: You don't have to say a word. Your counsel 
didn't put you on. You don't have to say anything. 
THE DEFENDANT: What did I pay him for? THE 
COURT: I don't know. Take him out. [DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]: Thank you." 
Needless to say the judgment was reversed. 
Comment and instructions. Despite Griffin v. 'r;alifornia9 
the problem of comment on the failure of the accused to 
testify will continue. Aside from the fact that every jury has 
at least one person on it who knows the implications of failure 
to testify and will raise them, there are other problems. 
In People v. Hernandez 10 the prosecutor asked for and the 
trial judge gave CALJIC 51 which instructs the jury not to 
draw an inference of guilt from the failure of the defendant 
to testify and not to discuss this in the jury room. Must this 
instruction be given at the request of the defendant, at the 
9. 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 10. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
S.Ct. 1229 (1965). 330 (1968). 
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request of the prosecutor, or sua sponte? Hernandez includes 
numerous citations. Doubtless the matter will be taken up 
by the supreme court. The Hernandez court solved the prob-
lem by saying that it was error to give the instruction, but not 
reversible error. 
In People v. McClellan,ll the court stated the Griffin prob-
lem just about as well as it could possibly be stated. It said: 
" the judgments against McClellan and Ford, two 
murderers, must now be reversed because the supreme court 
changed the rules after the case was tried." Palmer, their 
victim, won't mind. He is dead. 
Some of the Griffin opinions are way off base. For exam-
ple, in People v. Summerfield/2 the court gave a modified 
version of CALJIC 235 to the effect that evidence that a 
person in possession of stolen property soon after it was taken 
who has a reasonable opportunity to explain his possession 
may tend to show his guilt by not making an explanation. 
This is an obvious truth, but the jury must never be told this, 
at least if his appeal goes to the Court of Appeal, Second 
District, Division Three. Judge Frampton sitting pro tern. 
dissented. 
What are we going to do about CALJIC anyway? Some 
district attorneys treat it as gospel and provide ample copies 
for all to use. Others arbitrarily refuse to use it preferring 
their own boiler plate. CALJIC is used all over the country. 
It is now prepared by a committee of judges in Los Angeles 
county. Should it be completely revised? Should it be turned 
over to a statewide committee? Should the committee be 
judges? One thing I have noted is the long delay between 
the time a new decision comes down and CALJIC discovers 
it. Raymond Sinetar comments on these problems in a recent 
article. 13, 14 
11. 257 Cal. App.2d 350, 
Rptr. 903 (1967). 
12. 262 Cal. App.2d 626, 
Rptr. 10 (1968). 
13. Sine tar, A Belated 
612 CAL LAW 1969 
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Look 
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Cal. 
at 
CALlIC, 43 Cal. State Bar J. 546 
(1968). 
14. See also Letters to Editor 43 
State Bar Journal 706, 709 (1968). 
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Post-Trial Proceedings 
Sentencing. Troublesome problems of out-of-state prior 
convictions continue to arise. Illustrative is the case of In 
re Finley.15 The defendant was convicted of first degree rob-
bery. He admitted a prior second degree burglary in Wash-
ington in 1932 and a prior first degree robbery in California, 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual crim-
inal. He now attacks the determination of habitual criminal-
ity because second degree burglary in Washington is defined 
differently than in California. There it is entry to commit 
any crime whether felony or misdemeanor. Here it is entry 
with intent to commit any felony or grand or petit larceny. 
The only record available, an authenticated copy of the Wash-
ington judgment, does not show whether he entered with 
intent to commit a misdemeanor other than petit larceny. 
Thus, says the court, the thirty-six year old Washington judg-
ment cannot support a finding of habitual criminality. The 
court refused to overrule a line of cases which determined 
that by habeas corpus there could be inquiry into the under-
lying facts of the conviction.16 This is of course an exception 
to the normal rule that review on habeas corpus extends only 
to the face of the record. The exception here is because there 
is an issue of "fundamental constitutional deprivation." How-
ever, the defendant still is serving an indeterminate sentence 
of five years to life and his petition for habeas corpus was 
denied. He won the battle but lost the war. 
Again this year there were numerous decisions involving 
the problem of double punishment and the unfortunate lan-
guage of Penal Code section 654.17 One of the worst was 
the case of In re Hayes. 1s There the defendant drove a motor 
vehicle with knowledge that his driving privilege was sus-
pended (Vehicle Code section 14601). At the same time 
he drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
15. 68 Cal.2d 389, 66 Cal. Rptr. 733, 17. Neal v. California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 
438 P.2d 381 (1968). 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960). 
16. See, e.g., In re McVickers, 29 18. 68 A.C. 899, 69 Cal. Rptr. 310, 
Ca1.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946), as well 442 P.2d 366 (1968), rehearing granted, 
as cases cited in Finley. Aug. 8, 1968. 
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(Vehicle Code section 23102). He pleaded guilty to both 
offenses and was sentenced for both. On habeas corpus he 
contended that this was forbidden double punishment. The 
court concluded in a 4-3 decision that both offenses consti-
tuted a single act and granted the writ. The minority points 
out that each offense is obviously a separate offense. One 
can drive while intoxicated and properly licensed. One can 
drive while sober without a license. They are unrelated 
offenses and even accepting the various decisions under section 
654, this one is wrong. Both the majority and minority 
opinions provide useful summaries of the morass which has 
bogged down the court in this area. Hopefully the Penal 
Code revision process will straighten it OUt.19 
Appeal. The problem of the duty of counsel on appeal 
where there is no merit to the appeal was considered in 
People v. Feggans. 20 The problem resulted from Douglas v. 
California,l where the United States Supreme Court created 
a due process right of counsel on appeal for indigents. It 
was compounded by Anders v. California2 where the same 
court discovered another "due process" right, the right to 
make frivolous appeals. In F eggans, the California Supreme 
Court set forth guidelines for no merit appeals which seem 
to go further than required by Anders. Counsel must prepare 
a brief setting forth the facts, include citations to the tran-
script, discuss the legal issues, with citations to appropriate 
authority and argue all issues that are arguable. Counsel 
will not be permitted to withdraw until the court is satisfied 
that he has discharged these duties to the court and client. 
19. See, also, People v. Bell, 258 
Cal. App.2d 450, 65 Cal. Rptr. 730 
(1968) (possession of heroin, marijuana 
and amidone is three offenses); People 
v. McKerney, 257 Cal. App.2d 64, 64 
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967) (defendant un-
clothed was shining a flashlight upon 
himself; thereafter he saw victim and 
assaulted her with intent to commit 
rape; the victim screamed; another per-
son saw the naked defendant; misde-
meanor offense of indecent exposure set 
aside because of § 654); People v. Chap-
614 CAL LAW 1969 
man, 261 Cal. App.2d 149, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 601 (1968) (victim after being 
robbed of tavern receipts was taken else-
where and personally robbed and mur-
dered; held to be one offense). There 
are a number of other § 654 decisions. 
20. 67 Cal.2d 444, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 
432 P.2d 21 (1967). 
1. 372 U.S. 353, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 
S.Ct. 814 (1963). 
2. 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 
S.Ct. 1396 (1967). 
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In other words, it is the duty of the attorney to be intellectually 
dishonest. Bertram Ross suggests that he must make such 
arguments as that the statute does not apply to American 
Indians and there is nothing in the record which shows that 
the defendant is not an American Indian, or that the laws 
against murder should be repealed.3 He must be "willing to 
'do a snow job' for the court . . . with tongue in cheek 
be willing to help the administration of justice by lending his 
professional skill to such a travesty of justice." Mr. Ross's 
analogy to a Rube Goldberg cartoon is certainly apropos. 
Hopefully the public defenders will take over most of the 
burden. Who then will want to be a public defender? Who 
is going to pay for all this useless garbage? Remember 
the good old days when the courts used to chide attorneys for 
making frivolous appeals, often naming names in the opin-
ions. 
In re Ketcher involved the right of the counsel for a defend-
ant under sentence of death to have his client examined by a 
psychiatrist of his choice. The supreme court upheld this 
right over contentions that on appeal the attorney would be 
bound by the trial record. Two justices dissented. 
Habeas corpus. In the case of In re Cameron,s the defend-
ant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. He failed to perfect his appeal. Some ten years later 
he brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He con-
tends that at the time of the trial a successful appeal would 
have opened the way for a new trial and a possible sentence 
of death. Since that time the court in People v. Henderson6 
determined that a defendant who successfully appealed a life 
sentence conviction could not be sentenced to death. Cam-
eron successfully contended that the risk that he might receive 
a death penalty on retrial excused his failure to perfect his 
appeal. A three-justice minority was willing to allow habeas 
3. Wanted by the Appellate Courts 
-Competent Lawyers to Perform Mira-
cles for Indigent Appellants, 43 Cal. 
State Bar J. 381 (1968). 
4. 68 Ca1.2d 397, 66 Cal.Rptr. 881, 
438 P.2d 625 (1968). 
5. 68 Ca1.2d 487, 67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 
439 P.2d 633 (1968), see also earlier 
discussion at note 15 p. 107 supra. 
6. 60 Cal.2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 
386 P.2d 677 (1963). 
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corpus under such circumstances but thought that the major-
ity's attempt to search the recesses of the defendant's mind to 
fathom his motivation for abandoning his appeal was "a 
chimerical and futile exercise." 
Probation.7 Courts continue to impose rather ridiculous 
conditions on probation. They have been known to order a 
probationer to stay away from ex-convicts when his wife is an 
ex-convict. They order him to stay away from bars when 
there is no evidence that drinking had anything to do with his 
problems. Illustrative is People v. Dominguez,S where a con-
dition of probation was that the defendant not become preg-
nant without being married. At the time of her conviction 
for second degree robbery she was unmarried and pregnant. 
She also had two illegitimate children. She accepted the con-
dition and the judge suggested that she might find out where 
the Planned Parenthood Clinic was located. To make a long 
story short she became pregnant again while unmarried and 
the trial judge revoked probation. The court of appeal held 
that the condition of probation was unreasonable. It was un-
related to the robbery. "Contraceptive failure is not an in-
dicium of criminality." 
Mentally disordered sex offender commitments. There 
were about a dozen decisions involving mentally disordered 
sex offender commitments. Most of them arose because of 
failure to be fully familiar with the rather involved statutory 
scheme and its rather intricate procedural requirements. Two 
such cases reached the supreme court. In People v. Foster,9 
apparently all concerned overlooked the fact that persons in-
eligible for probation under the Penal Code are excluded from 
the operation of the mentally disordered sex offender provi-
sions by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5500.5. One 
can sympathize with those who are forced not only to be 
familiar with the sex offender provisions but also with that 
7. See, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128,· 19 L.Ed.2d 336, 88 S.C!. 254 
(1967), where the court creates some 
limited rights to counsel at the time 
when sentence is being imposed upon 
revocation of probation. 
616 CAL LAW 1969 
8. 256 Cal. App.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
290 (1967). The opinion collects ex-
amples of reasonable and unreasonable 
conditions of probation. 
9. 67 CaI.2d 604, 63 Cal. Rptr. 288, 
432 P.2d 976 (1967). 
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complex monstrosity, Penal Code section 1203. Foster was 
convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 288. Since he 
had earlier been convicted of another felony, the sex offender 
provisions were inapplicable. However, the court did say he 
was entitled to credit on his indeterminate sentence for his 
time spent at Atascadero. (How do you know if the Adult 
Authority gives such credit in determining an indeterminate 
sentence?) 
Another decision involving defective proceedings was Peo-
ple v. SUCCOp.l0 The case involved the preliminary determi-
nation whether to send the defendant to Atascadero for 90 
days for examination. He was not advised of his rights to 
make a reply and produce witnesses at his sex offender pro-
ceeding. He was also denied a right to cross-examine the 
psychiatrists. Furthermore, he was denied a right to produce 
evidence on his own behalf. A new hearing was ordered. 
Narcotics commitments. There were also numerous de-
cisions involving the complicated procedures for narcotics 
commitments. Two are cited in a note. ll In People v. Coley/2 
defendant pleaded guilty on the condition that he would be 
accepted for narcotics treatment at the California Rehabilita-
tion Center. That Center determined that he was not a fit 
subject for confinement and treatment at the Center. The 
trial court upheld the Center, but then refused the defendant's 
application to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was held to 
be an abuse of discretion. 
Substantive Criminal Law 
Diminished Capacity. Should this court-invented doc-
trine be denominated as diminished responsibility or di-
minished capacity? The supreme court is using the latter 
10. 67 Ca1.2d 785, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
569, 433 P.2d 473 (1967), cert. den. 390 
U.S. 983, 19 L.Ed.2d 1281, 88 S.Ct. 
1104. 
11. These are not discussed here be-
cause the supreme court granted hearing 
and decided them since the termination 
date for coverage in this article. See, 
People v. Moore, 68 Cal. Rptr. 98 
(1968), 69 Cal.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 
446 P.2d 800 (1968); People v. Murphy, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968), 70 Cal.2d -, 
74 Cal. Rptr. 65, 448 P.2d 945 (1969). 
12. 258 Cal. App.2d 787, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 559 (1968). 
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expression. However, most of its recent decisions seem 
to be grounded on the notion that some defendants be-
cause of mental conditions should be held to a lower 
degree of responsibility than others. At least some of 
these decisions are frankly grounded on the idea that the per-
sonal turpitude of the defendant is the distinguishing factor 
between first and second degree murder. There will always 
be psychiatrists willing to testify to diminished capacity due 
to mental defects or conditions.13 Some of us like the em-
phasis on personal turpitude of the defendant and are not 
too far off from the test of the majority in People v. Goedecke14 
where it said that the "controlling issue as to degree depends 
not alone on the character of the killing but also on the per-
sonal turpitude of the defendant.»l5 The extent of personal 
turpitude is a conclusion that a jury is well qualified to make, 
certainly more qualified than psychiatrists, or even a majority 
of the supreme court. If the court will become aware of the 
significance of this and take the next logical step it may es-
cape the bind in which it now finds itself. Psychiatrists should 
never be allowed to usurp the functions of the jury any more 
than appellate courtS.16 Let us either go back to the jury sys-
tem or turn the whole mess over to a panel of psychiatrists. 
The leading diminished capacity decision of the year, People 
v. Bassett,I7 is distinguished mostly by the fact that it was 
signed by the entire supreme court. Bassett methodicaIIy 
13. Cf. People v. Gentry, 257 Cal. 
App.2d 607, 65 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1968), 
where court appointed physician testi-
fied in a bad check case. Due to de-
fendant's neurotic disorder he had no 
intent to cheat or defraud. He cashed 
them out of fear that he might lose his 
wife and family. His fear kept him 
from fully understanding the quality of 
his actions! 
14. 65 Cal.2d 850, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625, 
423 P.2d 777 (1967). 
15. To say that I have sympathy with 
the test is not to say that I do not 
think that the court misapplied it. See 
discussion in Cal Law Trends and De-
velopments 1967, at p. 403. I feel that 
618 CAL LAW 1969 
the court must turn this issue over to 
the trier of fact on properly developed 
instructions. 
16. Compare Roche, The Criminal 
Mind (1958), pp. 108, 617-618. Dr. 
Roche says that a psychiatrist who an-
swers moral questions is testifying as a 
man, not as a psychiatrist. "The con-
clusions, the inferences, from the facts 
are for the trier of facts." I wrote a 
nasty book review of Dr. Roche's award 
winning book some years ago. 26 Chi-
cago L. Rev. 485 (1959). My respect 
for his ideas-not the way he expresses 
them-continues to grow. 
17. 69 Cal.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 
443 P.2d 777 (1968). 
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planned and executed the murders of his father and mother. 
He knew his crimes were wrong. However, even the district 
attorney admitted he was and had been a paranoid schizo-
phrenic. Bassett was convicted of first degree murder. There 
was ample psychiatric testimony of diminished capacity, and 
very little to the contrary. The court reduced the crime to 
second degree murder without even finding it necessary to 
talk about personal turpitude. 
One can speculate why the court in Bassett did not reduce 
the offense to manslaughter, or even not gUilty. Certainly the 
diminished capacity doctrine has the effect of creating by ju-
diciallegislation a kind of non-statutory manslaughter.18 Per-
haps People v. Moore19 furnishes a clue to the unexpressed 
reasoning of the court. There, in a court trial, it was con-
tended that the diminished capacity of the defendant reduced 
his murder to manslaughter The trial judge expressed as 
part of his reasons for refusing to accept this contention the 
"societal" problem, the need for something more permanent 
than temporary confinement. He was reversed for frankly 
expressing his reasoning. Perhaps the supreme court in some 
of its decisions does not express its fear of turning loose on 
society some of the results of the Frankenstein monster it 
created when it invented diminished capacity. 
All of this points to the need of legislation. The supreme 
court can legislate and create new types of manslaughter but 
perhaps it finds itself in difficulties in providing procedures-
for example-to convict someone like Bassett of manslaughter 
(maximum 15 years) or acquit him altogether. Bassett must 
never be freed. If you doubt this, read the opinion signed by 
all the justices. The penal code revision project would con-
tinue to allow proof of a mental disease or defect when rele-
vant to prove a state of mind (W ells-Gorshen) . However, 
it would require notice that mental condition will be in issue 
as is now the case where the defendant pleads not guilty by 
18. See People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 
310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911 
(1966); People v. Moore, 257 Cal. App. 
2d 740, 65 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1968); Peo-
pIe v. Aubrey, 253 Cal. App.2d 912, 61 
Cal. Rptr. 772 (1967). 
19. 257 Cal. App.2d 740, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 450 (1968). 
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reason of insanity. Such notice would set in motion a proce-
dure for court appointed psychiatrists much as we have now 
when there is a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Even 
if the defendant is acquitted by reason of diminished capacity 
procedures are set up for his commitment.2o 
A technical problem which has not been resolved in the 
area of diminished capacity is whether the trial court has the 
duty to give sua sponte a diminished capacity instruction 
where some evidence comes before the court as to mental 
defect or intoxication. The cases seem to go both ways.l 
Homicide. Homicide decisions were rare as earlier pointed 
out because the supreme court did decide but one death pen-
alty decision of consequence, a diminished capacity case. Two 
other decisions were of interest. In People v. Lilliock,2 the 
question was whether it is proper to give a felony-murder in-
struction when the murder information was returned after the 
running of the statute of limitations for the underlying felony. 
The court asked for supplemental briefs on this point. No 
authority was found either by the court or counsel. The court 
felt that the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter neg-
ligent or accidental killings in the course of the felony. It 
decided it would permit a felony-murder instruction even 
where the statute of limitations would bar prosecution of the 
constituent felonies. 
In People v. Lovato,S the problem was whether the second 
degree felony-murder doctrine applies where the underlying 
felony is possession of a concealable weapon by an alien 
(Penal Code section 12021). A divided court held that the 
doctrine would not apply. By judicial decision the ullder-
20. See Joint Legislative Committee 
for Revision of the Penal Code, Tent. 
Draft No.2, §§ 530-535. 
1. See, e.g. People v. Fanning, 265 
Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr 641 
(1968) (should have been given in rob-
bery case; dissent); People v. Muszalski, 
260 Cal. App.2d 611, 67 Cal. Rptr. 378 
(1968) (not prejudicial in murder case); 
People v. Farr, 255 Cal. App.2d 679, 
620 CAL LAW 1969 
63 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1967) (should have 
been given sua sponte in murder case); 
People v. Bolton, 255 Cal. App.2d 485, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1967), certiorari de-
nied, 390 U.S. 1032,20 L.Ed.2d 291, -
S.Ct. - (not error). 
2. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
434 (1968). 
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 290, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 638 (1968). 
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lying felony for second degree murder must be inherently 
dangerous to human life. Whether the felony is such is a 
judicial determination made by looking at the elements of the 
felony in the abstract not the particular facts of the case.4 
The court refused to accept the analogy to cases where it has 
been held that possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-
felon, also in violation of Penal Code section 12021 looked 
at in the abstract is inherently dangerous to human life. An 
ex-felon has already demonstrated his instability and propen-
sity for crime. On the othyr hand most aliens are law abiding 
persons. Simply carrying a concealable firearm does not in 
the abstract demonstrate instability. 
This case is certainly correct in the light of controlling su-
preme court decisions. However, it demonstrates some of the 
difficulties raised for lower courts when the supreme court 
turns from adjudicating to legislating. 5 The defendant carried 
the weapon with a purpose to commit murder. By using it he 
did demonstrate that the felony-not in the abstract but con-
cretely-was dangerous to life. Looked at abstractly the 
carrying of a concealable weapon by an alien, or even by an 
ex-felon, is not necessarily dangerous to life. But if the alien 
uses it to commit dangerous acts, perhaps the violation of the 
statute helps to demonstrate that conscious disregard of human 
life which under our judicial decisions distinguishes murder 
from manslaughter. Thus in People v. Phil/ips6 the court said 
that a killing is second degree murder if "the killing prox-
imately resulted from an act, the natural consequences of 
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately per-
formed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers 
the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for 
life." The court suggests that the line between murder and 
manslaughter depends primarily upon whether a subjective 
or objective test is applied "in determining whether the de-
fendant acted with conscious disregard of life." The Lovato 
4. People v. Williams, 63 Ca1.2d 452, 
47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647 (1965); 
People v. Phillips, 64 Ca1.2d 574, 51 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353 (1966). 
5. Cf. Note, Recent Developments-
Ca/ijomia Rewrites the FelollY Murder 
Rule, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 690, 697 (1966). 
6. 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
414 P.2d 353 (1966). 
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case was tried on a felony-murder theory, not on a reckless 
murder theory. It goes back for a possible retrial on that 
theory. 
Of course, if the Phillips test is properly applied the felony-
murder doctrine is really not necessary. However, Phillips 
does represent a limitation on the common-law felony-murder 
doctrine. The felony-murder doctrine can no longer apply 
where the underlying felony, theft by false pretenses, looked 
at in the abstract is not dangerous to life. Phillips obtained 
money by falsely representing that he could cure a child's can-
cer without surgery. There was evidence that surgery which 
Phillips knew was then contemplated could have saved the 
child's life. The trial jury could certainly infer from this and 
other evidence, the sort of recklessness described by the court 
as the essence of second degree murder, that is, "conscious 
disregard of life." But it cannot convict him of second degree 
felony-murder. 
A man named Roman murdered a police officer. His con-
tention was that he could not be convicted of murder because 
the entry of the officers prior to the murder in response to a 
child beating complaint was illegal. All the evidence was 
that they entered legally. However, the decision in People v. 
Roman,7 contains a dictum to the effect that unlawful arrest 
no longer furnishes sufficient provocation to reduce murder to 
manslaughter. This is the result of the enactment of Penal 
Code section 834a in 1957. 
Assault and Deadly Weapons. Several decisions involved 
interpretation of assault statutes. In People v. Curtis,S the 
defendant assaulted a peace officer with a broom handle 
during the course of an arrest for burglary. The court found 
that there was no probable cause for the arrest. The defend-
ant was held properly convicted of a battery on a peace officer 
(Cal. Penal Code section 243). The court read section 243 
7. 256 Cal. App.2d 656, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 268 (1967). 
8. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
27 I (I968). Hearing granted Sept. 11, 
1968. See also, People v. Hooker, 254 
622 CAL LAW 1969 
Cal. App.2d 878, 62 Cal. Rptr. 675 
(1967) which holds that a peace officer 
who is working part time as a detective 
in a store is still a peace officer within 
the meaning of Penal Code § 243. 
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with section 834a which takes away the right to use force to 
resist an arrest by a police officer. It upheld the constitution-
ality of section 834a. 
People v. Romo,9 involved an interpretation of Penal Code 
section 4501 (assault with a deadly weapon by person confined 
in state prison) and section 4502 (possession of deadly 
weapon by person confined in state prison, or at prison camps 
or farms). The defendant, a Youth Authority ward, was an 
inmate of Deuel Vocational Institution, which is a Department 
of Corrections institution. Penal Code section 6082 seems 
to limit Title 5 of Part 3, which includes sections 4501 and 
4502, to persons in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions, thus excluding Youth Authority wards. The court 
held therefore that the defendant could not be convicted under 
the two sections. It modified the judgment to declare defend-
ant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Penal Code sec-
tion 245). The dissenting judge read section 2041 as making 
sections 4501 and 4502 as applicable to Deuel whether the 
inmates were from the Youth Authority or not. It should 
be rell";,mbered that Deuel is a medium security institution 
which contains some very dangerous individuals. Doubtless 
the Department of Corrections will cause remedial legislation 
to be introduced. 
There were two narrow decisions on definitions under Penal 
Code section 12020. The supreme court by a 5-2 decision 
held that a long knife is not a "dirk or dagger. "10 A court of 
appeal held that what apparently were homemade brass 
knuckles were not "metal knuckles."l1 Penal Code section 
12020 et seq. obviously are in need of thorough revision. 
Kidnaping. Or should I be archaic and say kidnapping? 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that the 
capital punishment clause of the federal kidnaping act is un-
9. 256 Cal. App.2d 589, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
151 (1967). 
10. People v. Forrest, 67 Cal.2d 478, 
62 Cal. Rptr. 766, 432 P.2d 374 (1967). 
11. People v. Deane, 259 Cal. App. 
2d 82, 66 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1968). Peo-
ple v. Williams, 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 882 (1968) (§ 243 is constitu-
tional); Pittman v. Superior Court, 256 
Cal. App.2d 795, 64 Cal. Rptr. 473 
(1967) (conviction under § 245(b) can be 
sustained even though assault on police 
officer occurred after illegal entry into 
house where assault took place). 
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constitutional. This is because of failure to set forth a proce-
dure for imposing the death penalty on a defendant who waives 
right to jury trial or one who pleads guilty.12 Under the fed-
eral statute the defendant is practically forced to waive his 
right to trial by jury where he might be given a death penalty 
to seek a trial by a judge who cannot impose that penalty. 
However, according to one of our courts in People v. Spaniel/3 
there is no deficiency in the California statute. As construed 
by the courts and as a result of Penal Code section 190.1, 
either the judge or jury can impose the death penalty. 
Whether the supreme court will frustrate the decision may be 
a matter of some doubt. 
Theft. 14 Can a person who enters an establishment and 
makes purchases with a stolen credit card be convicted of bur-
glary? The credit card statute (Penal Code section 484a(b) 
(6)) at the time made it a felony if the goods were worth over 
$50, otherwise a misdemeanor. The court in People v. Scott15 
answered the question in the negative. It relied on the prin-
ciple paid down in In re Williamson,16 that a special statute ex-
cepts the matter included in a broader general act. If this 
decision is correct then the credit card offenses can no longer 
be treated as burglary. This would also mean that a person 
who uses a stolen credit card to obtain goods over $50 and 
commits a homicide in the course of the transaction could not 
be convicted under the felony murder rule. Statutes in the 
theft area have grown like Topsy and are badly in need of a 
complete revision. For example the statute might well provide 
that purchases made in various stores with a stolen credit card 
could be accumulated to make the offense a felony. For that 
matter, why draw the line between felony and misdemeanor 
at all? 
Vehicle Code. Vehicle Code offenses make up a large part, 
12. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. for a good description of the "Jamaica 
570, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, 88 S.C!. 1209 Switch." 
(1968). 15. 259 Cal. App.2d 589, 66 Cal. 
13. People v. Spaniel, 262 Cal. App. Rptr. 432 (1968). 
2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1968). 16. 43 Cal.2d 651, 276 P.2d 593 
14. See People v. Ornforff, 261 Cal. (1954). 
App.2d 212, 67 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1968), 
624 CAL LAW 1969 
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perhaps a majority, of those which come to the attention of the 
courts each year. It seems right that Cal Law should at least 
mention some of the problems. 
One important problem is persons driving with suspended 
operators' licenses. There are thousands of them. They at 
least have shown signs of being dangerous drivers or their 
licenses would not have been suspended. It is not easy to have 
a license suspended. Many of them have no public liability 
insurance or financial responsibility. The supreme court in 
In re Murdock/7 practically destroyed enforcement of the laws 
against such drivers. The statute, Vehicle Code section 
14601, makes it a crime to drive an automobile with knowl-
edge that the operator's license has been suspended. Re-
member we are dealing with defendants who are quite ready 
to mark a letter from the Department of Motor Vehicles with 
a curt "Moved, left no address." The Department to date does 
not try to contact them personally. It may have to henceforth 
with expenses paid by the taxpayers. 
Vehicle Code section 14600 (a) requires that any person 
with an operator's license who moves notify the Department of 
his new address within 10 days. Couple that with the fact 
that a defendant who engages in some crime or other activity 
which requires suspension of his license is presumed to know 
the law-or at least was prior to 1968-is there not con-
structive knowledge that his license has been suspended? The 
supreme court says that is not enough. 
In the Murdock case, the defendant was involved in an 
automobile accident and had his license suspended. Before 
then he had moved and failed to give notice of change of ad-
dress. The Department notified him of his suspension at his 
last known address. This notification letter was returned 
marked "Moved, left no address." Thereafter he was arrested 
for speeding and driving with a suspended driver's license. 
The supreme court 5-2 held that constructive knowledge 
(failure to report change of address, accident, etc.) was not 
enough. As the dissent pointed out, one who moves frequently 
17. 68 Cal.2d 313, 66 Cal. Rptr. 380, 
437 P.2d 764 (1968). 
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and fails to notify the Department of change of address can 
now drive indefinitely with a suspended driver's license. 
Doubless the Department is working on this problem. Mur-
dock is not a constitutional law case. The legislature can sub-
stitute for the word "knowledge" in the statute the terms no-
tice or constructive knowledge and define them carefully. 
Another possible solution would be to provide for forfeiture 
of motor vehicles driven by a driver with a suspended driver's 
license. Why should not the grantors of credit be required to 
see that the debtor has a valid license? Department of Motor 
Vehicle computers can check this in a few minutes. There 
must be 9 or 10 million licensed drivers in California. Surely 
there is some way to keep the unlicensed off the roads-
perhaps by tying driver's license, motor vehicle registration, 
and realistic financial responsibility (i.e. either insurance or 
cash deposit) together. 
As of this year at least the crime of failure to stop at the 
scene of an accident and file reports is not unconstitutional. 
The cases of Byers v. Justice Court18 and People v. Bammes19 
so held. But considering the cases which held it unconstitu-
tional to require a gambler or a possessor of a firearm to reg-
ister and pay taxes,20 one may wonder if Byers and Bammes 
were decided properly (that is, in accordance, with United 
States Supreme Court precedents). The courts in Byers and 
Bammes try to distinguish these cases. They state that the 
purpose of the statutes involved was to coerce evidence from 
persons involved in illegal activities. But surely the purpose 
of making it a crime for failure to stop at the scene of the 
accident is to coerce those involved in illegal activities to stop. 
Those innocent of crime would stop anyway. Usually those 
who would not stop would be those who thought they might 
have committed a crime-e.g. driving under the influence, 
18. 265 A.c.A. 1031, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
609 (1968). Hearing granted Novem-
ber 12, 1968. 
19. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 
415 (1968). 
20. Marchetti v. United States, 390 
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U.S. 39, 19 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 697 
(1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 
U.S. 62, 19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709 
(1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 
U.S. 85, 19 L.Ed.2d 923, 88 S.Ct. 722 
(1968). 
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speeding, etc. In any event, one can't blame the courts for 
trying in Byers and Bammes. 
Failure to Provide. One of the nastiest problems in every 
district attorney's office is failure to provide. The cases are a 
nuisance. However, the threat of prosecution is a useful 
weapon to keep the "victim" off the welfare rolls and thereby 
help the county budget. People v. Sorensen l presents an in-
teresting sidelight on the problem. Can a defendant who 
agrees to artificial insemination of his wife later be required 
to support the child? If he does not can he be convicted of 
failure to provide (Penal Code section 270)? The supreme 
court answered these questions affirmatively in a unanimous 
opinion. Artificial insemination in California is not adultery. 
Nor are the offspring illegitimate. Of course the court had to 
stretch the word "father" in Penal Code section 270 a 
little. 
Sex Crimes. An uncle may be hot-blooded or cold-blooded, 
but if he is half-blooded, he cannot be guilty of incest.1! Penal 
Code section 285 will not be interpreted to apply to sexual 
relations between an uncle and the daughter of defendant's 
half sister. Justice McComb dissented. 
Two divisions of the court of appeal considered the consti-
tutionality of Penal Code section 286 (sodomy) and section 
288a (oral copulation). Both involved consensual relations. 
In each it was argued that the statute involved is a violation 
of the right to privacy protected as a result of Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 3 Neither case was a very good one in which 
to raise the issue. In one the act took place in the public 
portion of a park restroom. The other took place in 
Atascadero. Needless to say each court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the section involved.4 The tentative penal code 
revision would remove penal sanctions from consensual sexual 
1. 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 
437 P.2d 495 (1968). 
2. People v. Baker, 69 Ca1.2d -, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675 (1968). 
3. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 
S.Ct. 1678 (1965). 
4. People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 
2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967), re-
versed on other grounds, People v. 
Frazier, 256 Cal. App.2d 630, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 447 (1967). 
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relations of all sorts where adults are involved.s A loitering 
statute would take care of the public restroom situation. One 
may assume that some place the draftsmen will take care of the 
institutional situation. 
People v. Smith,6 points to some rather ridiculous problems 
in proving a rape case. The prosecutor did not ask the victim 
if she was the defendant's wife. Fortunately there was cir-
cumstantial evidence that proved she was not. Prosecutors 
should not only be careful about following the statute in plead-
ing. They should also follow the pleading in making their 
case even if it does make them sound a little foolish. Ask her 
if she is married to the defendant. Ask her if the place where 
the crime took place is in the county. 
Disorderly Conduct.7 There are numerous disorderly con-
duct, riot, etc., cases this year. Perhaps a few should be 
mentioned. 
The supreme court in a very brief opinion upheld the con-
stitutionality of Penal Code section 404.6, relative to incite-
ment to riot. 8 The problem of section 404.6 is that its applica-
tion is limited to cases where there is a clear and present dan-
ger of force or violence. Recent riots have been planned well 
ahead of time. Any clear and present danger test is clearly 
outmoded and should be overruled. The peace officers need a 
right to arrest the inciters well ahead of the riot. Thus if 
plans are being made in a public park for a subsequent riot 
at the induction center, public safety requires arrests and 
charges of offenses against the inciters while they are in the 
park. Why wait until the riot takes place in front of the in-
duction center? 
Penal Code section 602 subd. (n) [formerly subd. (0)], 
5. Joint Legislative Committee for 
Revision of the Penal Code, Tent. Draft 
No.1, §§ 1600-1608. 
6. 263 Cal. App.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
670 (1968); cf. People v Gann, 259 Cal. 
App.2d 706, 66 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1968). 
7. See, Hinshaw, Riot and the Law: 
"Justifiable Homicide," 43 Cal. State 
Bar J. 541 (1968); Powell v. Texas, 392 
628 CAL LAW 1969 
U.S. 514, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S.Ct. 
2145 (1968). (It seems that physicians 
cannot solve the problem of the com-
mon cold any more than lawyers and 
courts can solve the problem of the 
common drunk.) 
8. People v. Davis, 68 Cal.2d 481, 67 
Cal. Rptr. 547,439 P.2d 651 (1968). 
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making it a crime to refuse to leave a public building upon 
request after it is closed to the public, was upheld in Parrish 
v. Municipal Court. 9 And Penal Code section 602.7 relative 
to failure to leave a campus where directed was upheld in 
People v. Agnelio.lO 
I had difficulty deciding whether to end this article with a 
pervert or a rioter. I finally decided on the latter. Unques-
tionably both are perverted. Last year the kind people who 
worked like slaves to put together this useful and outstanding 
publication allowed me to end my article with a "God Bless 
You" to a Mrs. Wolff who successfully fought off a pervert. 
This year I hope they will give me the satisfaction of doing 
the same to someone else who so far is successfully fighting 
off other perverts. GOD BLESS YOU PRESIDENT HA Y A-
KAWA! 
9. 258 Cal. App.2d 497,65 Cal. Rptr. 10. 259 Cal. App.2d 785, 66 Cal. 
862 (1968). Rptr. 571 (1968) . 
• 
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